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The global financial crisis has led to a range of proposals for
reforming the regulatory framework that governs the bank-
ing sector, with a view to enhancing its resilience. Agreement
has already been reached on some aspects of these new rules,
which are collectively referred to as “Basel III” (box 1). The
proposed new regulations cover both microprudential or
firm-specific measures and macroprudential measures aimed
at strengthening the resilience of the banking system as a
whole by addressing the procyclicality of banking and limit-
ing the risks arising from the interconnectedness among fi-
nancial institutions.
Although the proposed reforms are expected to generate
substantial benefits (namely, by reducing the frequency and
intensity of banking crises), concerns have been raised that,
in the short term, the costs of moving to higher capital ratios
may lead banks to raise their lending rates and reduce lend-
ing.1 In particular, if these regulations are implemented over
a short period of time, there could be a consequent drag on
the economic recovery in countries adopting these regula-
tions and in those emerging markets closely dependent on
global banking flows.
Based on an analysis of the determinants of bank flows from
advanced economies to emerging markets that focuses on the
nature of the financial links between these countries, this note
examines the impact of the regulatory changes proposed un-
der Basel III on emerging markets. The focus is exclusively on
what could be referred to as the “financial flows channel”—
that is, through reduced lending and changes in interest rates.
Estimates of the Potential Short-Term 
Impact of Basel III Vary Widely
The range of estimates of the potential short-term impacts
on lending rates, volumes, and economic activity among ad-
vanced economies adopting Basel III is quite broad. Two
such estimates are those of the Macro Assessment Group
(MAG) and the Institute for International Finance (IIF).
Based on models covering 17 countries, the MAG report
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The global financial crisis has led to a range of reform proposals concerning the regulatory framework governing the
banking sector—collectively referred to as “Basel III.” Although the proposed reforms are expected to generate
substantial benefits by reducing the frequency and intensity of banking crises, concerns have been raised that, in the
short term, the costs of moving to higher capital ratios may lead banks to raise their lending rates and reduce
lending. This note explores the near-term implications of Basel III capital regulations on bank flows to emerging
markets, based on an analysis of the key determinants of these flows.finds that the median estimated increase in lending spreads
is roughly 15 basis points by 2015 in response to a 1 percent-
age point increase in the target capital ratio over four years
(MAG 2010, table 1, p. 17). The IIF report—which looks at
the Euro Area, Japan, and the United States—assumes a 2
percentage point increase in the target capital ratio (reflect-
ing both the increase in capital and the liquidity standards),
and it finds that this results in an increase in the average
lending spread of 132 basis points during 2011–15 (IIF
2010a, table 3, p. 15).
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Box 1. Proposed Basel III Reforms
The proposed Basel III reforms aim to strengthen micropruden-
tial regulations (to help raise the resilience of individual banking
institutions) and macroprudential regulations (to address sys-
temwide risks that can build up across the banking sector and
the procyclical amplification of these risks over time). Although
the cornerstone of the reforms is stronger capital and liquidity re-
quirements, these are being buttressed by measures to improve
supervision, risk management, governance, transparency, and
disclosure. The measures that were agreed by the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision and the governors and heads of su-
pervision in September 2010 include the following:
• Strengthening the quality, consistency, and transparency
of capital to ensure that banks are better able to absorb
losses. Tier 1 capital will need to be predominately in the
form of common shares and retained earnings, Tier 2 cap-
ital instruments will be harmonized, and Tier 3 capital will
be eliminated.
• Raising the level of the minimum capital requirements.
Under the current Basel II, core and regular Tier 1 capital
are 2.0 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively. Under
Basel III, core Tier 1 capital will rise to 4.5 percent and
Tier 1 capital will rise to 6.0 percent. The phase-in period
is as follows: core Tier 1 capital to 3.5 percent in January
2013, to 4.0 percent in January 2014, and to 4.5 per-
cent in January 2015. The difference between the total
capital requirement of 8.0 percent and the Tier 1 require-
ment can be met with Tier 2 capital. Also, a capital con-
servation buffer of 2.5 percent on top of Tier 1 is to be in-
troduced to ensure that banks maintain capital that can
be used to absorb losses during periods of financial and
economic stress. Although banks are allowed to draw on
the buffer during such periods, the closer their regulatory
capital ratios approach the minimum requirement, the
greater the constraints will be on earnings distributions.
(Currently, under Basel II, there is no capital conservation
buffer.) The capital conservation buffer begins at 0.625
percent in January 2016, rises to 1.250 percent in Jan-
uary 2017, goes to 1.875 percent in January 2018, and
rises again to 2.500 percent in January 2019. Under
Basel III, the total common equity requirement will rise
to 7.0 percent.
• Increasing the risk coverage of the capital framework—
particularly, for trading activities, securitizations, expo-
sures to off-balance-sheet vehicles, and counterparty
credit exposures arising from derivatives.
• Introducing an internationally harmonized leverage ratio
to serve as a backstop to the risk-based capital measure
and to contain the buildup of excessive leverage in the
system. 
• Raising the standards for the supervisory review process
(Pillar 2) and public disclosure (Pillar 3); together with
additional guidance in the areas of sound valuation prac-
tices, stress testing, liquidity risk management, corporate
governance, and compensation.
• Introducing minimum global liquidity standards, consist-
ing of both a short-term liquidity coverage ratio and a
longer-term structural net stable funding ratio. 
• Promoting the buildup of capital buffers that can be
drawn down in times of stress, including the capital con-
servation buffer mentioned above and a countercyclical
buffer to protect the banking sector from periods of exces-
sive credit growth. The proposed countercyclical buffer
will be within a range of 0–2.5 percent of common equity
and will be implemented according to national circum-
stances. 
The committee is also working with the Financial Stability Board
to address risks of systemically important banks. The committee
and the governors and heads of supervision have agreed that
these banks should have loss-absorbing capacity beyond the
minimum standards of the Basle III framework. Going forward,
the committee will also be working on (1) a fundamental review
of the trading book; (2) a review of the use and impact of external
ratings in the securitization capital framework; (3) the treatment
of large exposures; (4) enhanced cross-border bank resolution;
(5) a review of the core principles for banking supervision to re-
flect the lessons of the crisis; and (6) standards implementation
and stronger collaboration among bank supervisors.
Source: Based on BCBS 2010. In part, the differences in estimates reflect differences in
the regulatory changes assumed: whereas the MAG study
focuses largely on the impact of a higher regulatory capital
ratio, the IIF study also considers redefinition effects, higher
trading book capital, and a (1 percentage point) counter-
cyclical buffer. In fact, some market participants expect the
effective increase in core Tier 1 capital requirements under
the new rules (when all the capital-related changes are taken
into account, not simply those of the higher regulatory cap-
ital ratio) to be more than 2 percentage points—perhaps as
high as 6 percentage points (IIF 2010b, p. 20). As highlighted
by Slovik and Cournède (2011), the increase in capitaliza-
tion will also depend on whether banks fully maintain their
current discretionary capital buffers above the regulatory
minimums.
The broad range of estimates also reflects different as-
sumptions regarding the implementation period. This mat-
ters because the stock costs and flow costs of increasing cap-
ital differ. The “stock costs” of holding more equity arise
from factors such as taxes and agency conflicts that make eq-
uity capital more expensive, regardless of how that equity
comes onto the balance sheet (that is, regardless of whether
the equity is accumulated through new issuances or through
retained earnings). The “flow costs” are associated with the
process of reaching the new capital ratios. Many observers
have argued that the stock costs of holding more equity may
not be very significant because, even though equity is more
risky and thus costly, these risks (and costs) are likely to fall
as banks deleverage.2 In contrast, the flow costs will depend
in part on the length of time given for implementation. In-
deed, a more gradual phase-in period can enable banks to ad-
just to the new capital ratios in a least-costly manner, such
as through accumulating capital via retained earnings. Also,
although the Basel Committee has stretched the implemen-
tation until 2019, there are indications that market pressures
may lead banks to adopt these regulations at a faster pace.
Finally, the capital markets’ response as banks issue new
equity will also matter. The IIF report assumes that the cap-
ital markets’ response is less elastic, which leads to a higher
cost of equity. Much of this uncertainty is also subject to the
strength of the recovery following the global financial crisis.
In fact, the impact from higher lending rates and lower cred-
it availability on economic activity is itself subject to uncer-
tainty. The magnitude of the latter will depend, for instance,
on the different sources of financing. In turn, in countries
where capital markets can provide an alternative source of
financing, the impact is likely to be less. Moreover, the re-
sponse of monetary authorities to any regulation-induced
economic slowdown (and, of course, the scope there is for
such a response) would also make a difference. Against this
background, table 1 shows the range of estimates of the im-
pact on lending rates and economic activity, reflecting the
differences in assumptions and the debate on the necessary
effective increase in capital under the new rules.
Emerging Markets Are Likely to 
Be Affected through Both T rade and
Financial Flows Channels
Although the magnitude is subject to considerable uncer-
tainty, there is agreement that there is likely to be some
short-term impact in countries adopting Basel III.3To the ex-
tent that short-term impacts materialize, emerging markets
are likely to be affected through several channels, even if one
excludes the impact from emerging markets themselves
adopting Basel III (figure 1). Two of these channels are of
particular importance. The first channel, which could be re-
ferred as the “trade flows channel,” acts through lower eco-
nomic activity in advanced economies and consequent lower
import activity on their part. The quantitative impact of this
channel depends on trade income elasticities. The second
channel, which we will refer to as the “financial flows chan-
nel,” is through higher interest rates and the decline in bank
flows from advanced economies to emerging markets. The
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Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: bps = basis points; pp = percentage points.
a. The range depends on how much capital adjustment is needed from a 1
percentage point increase to a 6 percentage point increase. The range of
both the increase in interest rates and the decline in economic activity is
obtained by taking the estimated impact under each study (namely, a 1
percentage point increase in common equity ratio) and multiplying it by 1–
6 percentage points.
Table 1. Short-Term Impacts of Basel III in Advanced Economies
Impact Impact
on on
lending economic Increase Decline in
rates activity in rates activity
Study (bps) (pp) Assumptions (bps) (pp)
MAG 15.4  –0.16, four  1 percentage  15–90 0.16–
and a half  point increase in 1.80
years after  common equity
implementation ratio, implement-
ed over four 
years 
IIF 132  –0.60  Package of  66–396 0.3–1.8
regulations, in-
cluding a 2 
percentage point 
rise in common 
equity ratio, 
capital redefini-
tion effects, and 
higher liquidity 
requirements 
Rangeaquantitative impact will depend on interest rate differentials,
global risks, and the overall dependence on such flows,
among other things.
In turn, within the financial flows channel, there is a di-
rect lending effect (lower lending from banks in advanced
economies to nonbanks in emerging markets) and an indi-
rect lending effect (lower lending from banks in advanced
economies to banks in emerging markets). These effects
might reinforce each other in the presence of agency prob-
lems in financial markets as a result of asymmetric informa-
tion and the costliness of enforcing contracts. For instance,
curtailment of direct loans to firms in emerging markets
could lead to a decline in investment, economic activity, and
asset prices. Specifically, if collateral is an important deter-
minant in banks’ lending decisions (as is generally the case
in emerging markets because of the costs of enforcing con-
tracts), the decline in asset prices can reduce domestic bank
lending. This also reinforces the initial decline in direct lend-
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Figure 1. Short-Term Impact of Proposed Basel III Regulations on Emerging Markets 
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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impact on banking systems
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Direct effect through 
lower lending to
nonfinancial institutionsing from banks in advanced economies. The impact of less
lending by banks in emerging markets will also depend on
the degree to which other forms of financing are or are not
available to borrowers. For instance, small and medium en-
terprises might not be able to offset the decline, given their
lack of access to stock or bond markets.
The Impact across Regions 
Will Be Differentiated
Focusing exclusively on the financial flows channel through
both direct and indirect lending, we simulate the likely im-
pact of increases in lending rates in advanced economies of
the kind discussed in table 1. The simulations are based on an
analysis of the determinants of bilateral banking flows from
17 advanced to 28 emerging markets in the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements locational statistics on bilateral banking
flows (see Ghosh, Sugawara, and Zalduendo forthcoming).
The determinants include the traditional push (global) and
pull (country-specific) factors that are typically identified as
important determinants of capital flows, as well as indicators
of nonfinancial and financial links. These links include meas-
ures of financial interconnectedness between lending and
borrowing countries and indicators on financial contagion.
Of course, these simulations should be viewed with cau-
tion because they assume there are no other changes. For in-
stance, the implicit assumption is that the behavioral re-
sponses will remain as valid even after a structural change of
the kind introduced by the new Basel III requirements.
Moreover, the calculations do not control for a reassessment
of risks in emerging market economies following the global
financial crisis. In fact, it could be argued that, on this count
alone, capital flows are likely to be much more subdued than
in the precrisis period. Disregarding these caveats, we expect
that emerging markets will record a decline of 3 percent in
banking inflows for each decline of 100 basis points in inter-
est rate differentials—the change of 100 basis points is in line
with the MAG and IIF reports.
At the level of each region, the impact will also depend
on  individual  countries’  reliance  on  banking  flows. We
choose two different scenarios: the first is relative to the av-
erage inflows during 2006–08, and the second is relative to
the average inflows of 2007. In both cases, we assume inter-
est rate differentials declines of 50, 100, and 200 basis points.
It is not surprising that the impact varies significantly across
regions, ranging from 0.25 percent of GDP among the EU10
for each change of 100 basis points to negligible levels in the
East  Asia  and  Pacific  and  the  Latin  America  and  the
Caribbean regions (figure 2).4 Thus, for some regions—
emerging Europe, in particular—the impact is not negligible,
and this would add to the likely broader reassessment of
emerging markets’ risk mentioned earlier.
Notes
1. Banks can meet higher capital ratios in three ways: (1)
issuing new equity; (2) increasing retained earnings through
a number of measures (reducing dividend payments, en-
hancing operating efficiency, raising average margins be-
tween borrowing and lending rates, and increasing noninter-
est [fee] income); and (3) reducing their risk-weighted assets
by lowering the size of loan portfolios, reducing or selling
nonloan assets, and shifting their balance sheet toward less
risky assets.
2. In an idealized world where the conditions set out by
the  Modigliani-Miller  theorem  hold,  this  effect  is  just
enough to offset the increased weight of the more expensive





































































b. Based on banking flows, 2007
050 bps
100 bps
200 bpsequity in the capital structure so that the overall cost of cap-
ital stays fixed as the bank leverage varies.
3. Over the medium to long term, banks would only face
the stock costs of holding higher capital. The Bank for Inter-
national Settlements has also undertaken a long-term impact
study in which it considers both the benefits and the costs of
the new regulations. It thus assesses the shift from one steady
state to another (with and without reforms) when the tran-
sition to the higher capital standards has been achieved. The
study finds that a 1 percentage point increase in the capital
requirement translates into a 0.09 percent median loss in the
level of steady-state output. But, of course, there are benefits
from holding higher capital in as much as it succeeds in low-
ering the frequency and severity of financial crises.
4. The average inflows to emerging Europe over the
2006–08 period was about 7 percent of GDP, thus resulting
in a decline of 0.28 percent of GDP for each interest rate
differentials decline of 100 basis points. This assumes, how-
ever, that there are no changes in interest rates in borrowing
countries.
References
BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision). 2010. The Basel Com-
mittee’s Response to the Financial Crisis: Report to the G20. Basel, Switzer-
land: Bank for International Settlements. http://www.bis.org/publ/bc
bs179.pdf.
Ghosh, S., N. Sugawara, and J. Zalduendo. Forthcoming. “Banking Flows and
Financial Crisis—Financial Interconnectedness and Basel III Effects.”
Working Paper, World Bank, Washington, DC.
IIF (Institute of International Finance). 2010a. “Interim Report on the Cu-
mulative Impact on the Global Economy of Proposed Changes in the
Banking Regulatory Framework.” Washington, DC.
———. 2010b. “The Net Cumulative Economic Impact of Banking Sector
Regulations: Some New Perspectives.” Washington, DC.
MAG (Macro Assessment Group). 2010. “Interim Report: Assessing the
Macroeconomic Impact of the Transition to Stronger Capital and Liq-
uidity Requirements.” Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settle-
ments.  http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_10081
8b.pdf.
Slovik, P., and B. Cournède. 2011. “Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III.”
Working Paper 844, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment. Paris, France. DOI 10.1787/5kghwnhkkjs8-en.
About the Authors
Swati Ghosh is economic adviser in the Office of the Vice Pres-
ident for the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management
Network, World Bank, Washington, DC. Naotaka Sugawara is
a consultant in the Office of the Chief Economist, Europe and
Central Asia Region, World Bank. Juan Zalduendo is lead
economist in the Office of the Chief Economist, Europe and Cen-
tral Asia Region, World Bank.
This note is based on Ghosh, Sugawara, and Zalduendo
(forthcoming).
The Economic Premise note series is intended to summarize good practices and key policy findings on topics related to economic policy. It is produced by the Poverty
Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Network Vice-Presidency of the World Bank. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect those of the World Bank. The notes are available at www.worldbank.org/economicpremise.